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Re: [nv-l] CERT security advisory on multiple SNMP implementations

To: nv-l@lists.tivoli.com
Subject: Re: [nv-l] CERT security advisory on multiple SNMP implementations
From: "JEFFREY SANDEN" <jasanden@us.ibm.com>
Date: Sat, 16 Feb 2002 11:41:37 -0500
I used this brute-force technique with a simple script a few years ago,
you'd need to verify the MIB is still correct (probably is).  It basically
simulates a "config net" command to bring statements in via tftp.  You
could easily put this in a loop, issuing once for each router.

Put the reconfiguration statements in <filename> in your tftpboot (or other
tftp default) directory on server a.b.c.d

For each <router>
/usr/OV/bin/snmpset <router> .1.3.6.1.4.1.9.2.1.53.a.b.c.d octetstring
<filename>

Jeff Sanden
Senior Consulting I/T Architect;  CCIE #5218
IBM Global Services,  Networking Consulting and Services
717-796-3234 (T/L 437)
---------------------- Forwarded by JEFFREY SANDEN/Mechanicsburg/IBM on
02/16/2002 11:30 AM ---------------------------

Leslie Clark/Southfield/IBM@IBMUS on 02/16/2002 10:22:59 AM

To:    nv-l@lists.tivoli.com
cc:
Subject:    Re: [nv-l] CERT security advisory on multiple SNMP
       implementations



We had our round a couple of months ago, remember?

Now for the Cisco situation. What are people using for massively telneting
to devices and issuing commands? In my current situation I am looking at
implementing ACLs for a few thousand devices. I know there are commercial
products out there for running scripts on devices. Any recommendations?

Cordially,

Leslie A. Clark
IBM Global Services - Systems Mgmt & Networking
Detroit




                    netview@toddh.
                    net (Todd H.)        To:     nv-l@lists.tivoli.com
                                         cc:
                    02/12/02 04:53       Subject:     [nv-l] CERT security
                    advisory on
                    PM                    multiple SNMP implementations







Oy...there goes the neighborhood.  NetView is clean, but a bunch of
devices in the average network are likely to be vulnerable:
        http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-03.html


I'm curious if anyone know how NetView got branded as not vulnerable
to trap format string attacks without the dependency on the security
e-Fix from 6.02 that came out in response to:
        http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-24.html

Perhaps because that vulnerability only existed if you launched
external scripts in event processing forked by ovactiond?

--
Todd H.
http://www.toddh.net/

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